The City of London’s strategists at The Economist published a pair of articles on July 30 charging that since President Trump is being soft on China’s “provocations against America’s Asian allies,” those allies had better take action to reverse this.
The articles make clear (1) that London is very unhappy that Presidents Xi and Trump may well hold three more summits this year; and (2) that the model for what can be done to sink this possibility is how the UK-led European “Coalition of the Willing” succeeded in changing Trump’s mind on the agreement he had reached in his Alaska summit with Russian President Putin in August 2025.
“Growing Chinese assertiveness is nothing new. But a pattern has been noticeable” of alleged Chinese military threats since Presidents Donal Trump and Xi Jinping met in South Korea in October 2025 and again in May, 2026 in Beijing, the most instructive of the two articles] “China Is Testing America’s Defence Lines in Asia” argues.
Since those two meetings, Trump and his officials “have since then contorted themselves to avoid uttering an ill word about China, and been slow to stand up for allies facing Chinese bullying, seemingly in the hope that three further summits planned for this year will thereby come off more smoothly.” The other piece, “China bets that Donald Trump won’t mind it bullying American allies,” focuses on the alleged military Chinese threat to the region.
The Economist does not name them, but the three possible summits are Xi’s still-planned state visit to Washington in September; the November APEC summit in Shenzhen, China where both are expected to be present; and the December G20 Summit in Miami—to be held at Trump National Doral Miami—to which both Putin and Xi have been invited.
What is to be done? “Faced with an unreliable America and an aggressive China, America’s allies in Asia need to do three things to improve their security: strengthen themselves, strengthen their ties with each other and strengthen America’s commitment to them.”
Europe, faced with the same problem, came up with “Plan Bs,” but unlike Europe, Asian allies do not spend enough on defense, they have “no NATO-style collective-security pact… and none of them has nukes.”
Therefore, they must change Trump’s mind. It is fine to “collaborate more deeply with the bits of the American system that still care about deterring China, such as the military brass,” but that will not be enough. The Asian nations should follow Zelensky’s example in convincing Trump “for example, that Ukraine does in fact hold some cards.” (The Economist discretely censors the UK-European leadership of that operation.)
Trump has attacked China before, as he did in his first term (a policy The Economist credits Japan’s former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo with accomplishing). So, The Economist instructs:
“Asian leaders need to make the case directly to the president that China threatens America’s position as the world’s leading superpower—and that its military ambitions go hand in glove with its industrial, technological and economic ambitions. If Mr Trump accepts that China remains a shrewd and potentially dangerous competitor, he may be willing to take a broader view of America’s interests in the Pacific.”
