As China and India rebuild ties after years of estrangement, Chinese officialdom has moved to tamp down a nationalist online backlash against the reopening.
A July 2 commentary in the state outlet The Paper (澎湃新闻)—written under “Xin Ping”—a collective byline used for pieces reflecting official positions, and republished in full on the Chinese Embassy in India’s website—rebuked the “self-styled patriotic” influencers spreading claims that Indians are “flooding” into China and that Beijing’s missions are recklessly handing out visas.
The conduct of a few cannot condemn a nation, the commentary argued; more than 80% of the visas issued to Indians are business visas; and China’s broader visa-easing is a deliberate opening, not a giveaway.
The frame is the Global South. Since Xi and Modi met at Kazan (BRICS, 2024) and Tianjin (SCO, 2025), the tension from the 2020 Galwan border clash has eased, direct flights have resumed, and—by India’s own statistics—bilateral goods trade hit $151.1 billion in FY2025–26, making China India’s largest trading partner just as India assumes the BRICS chair for 2026.
The connection is real but lopsided: India ran a record, approximately $112 billion deficit—importing $131 billion against $19 billion in exports—the asymmetry behind its curbs on Chinese apps and investment.
Still, that two rising powers of the Global South are choosing, against their own nationalists, to reconnect rather than harden into permanent rivalry is the more consequential story.
